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Abstract
The divide between government and opposition is clearly visible in the way members of parliament vote, but the variation
in government–opposition voting has been left relatively unexplored. This is particularly the case for contextual variation
in the extent to which parliamentary voting behaviour follows the government–opposition divide. This article attempts to
explain levels of government–opposition voting by looking at three factors: first, the majority status of cabinets
(differentiating between majority and minority cabinets), cabinet ideology (differentiating between more centrist and
more extremist cabinets) and norms about cabinet formation (differentiating between wholesale and partial alternation in
government). The study includes variation at the level of the country, the government and the vote. The article examines
voting in the Netherlands (with a history of partial alternation) and Sweden (with a history of wholesale alternation). We
find strong support for the effect of cabinet majority status, cabinet ideology and norms about cabinet formation on
government–opposition voting.
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Introduction
In parliaments, political parties interact every day creating
majorities for legislation. We know that the distinction
between opposition and government parties is crucial in
explaining voting behaviour under parliamentary govern-
ment (Cox and McCubbins, 2011; Hansen, 2006; Hix and
Noury, 2016; Morgenstern, 2004; Tuttnauer, 2014). Yet, as
Andeweg (2014) observes, there is a lack of comparative
analysis of parliamentary voting behaviour from the per-
spective of government and opposition as well as a lack of
theoretical work explaining under what circumstances this
distinction matters more or less.1
This article seeks to advance the comparative analysis of
parliamentary voting behaviour and our theoretical under-
standing of government–opposition dynamics in parlia-
ments. Central to our analysis is the idea that the nature
of the party system affects the relationship between
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government and opposition. We draw on the field of party
politics and in particular the work of Peter Mair (1997) and
propose that the distinction between wholesale and partial
alternation in government may affect the extent to which
government and opposition parties vote differently. In
some countries, only two governments are deemed possi-
ble: in these countries, there is either a cabinet supported by
left-wing parties or a cabinet supported by right-wing par-
ties, and these two alternate in office. In other countries,
more governments are deemed possible. After the elec-
tions, some parties stay in government, some rotate into
government and others rotate out: in those countries, all
parties of the centre-left and centre-right are potential gov-
ernment partners for each other. This means that in coun-
tries with partial alternation, parties have an interest in
maintaining cordial relations with the opposition, because
some of these may be future government partners, whilst in
countries with wholesale alternation such considerations do
not play a role.
This pattern can affect the division between government
and opposition directly, but there is also the possibility of
an indirect, mediation relationship. Countries with whole-
sale alternation tend to see more ideologically extreme
cabinets because the left and right alternate and never gov-
ern together (Strøm and Bergman, 2011). If the ideological
division between left and right and the division between
government and opposition coincide, there is little reason
for government and opposition to bridge the divide
between them, because there is little policy agreement
between parties of the opposition and of the government.
We test these explanations whilst at the same time also
examining the effect of the majority status of the cabinet.
During multiparty majority cabinets, the parliamentary par-
ties of the government may act as one bloc in order to
maintain the stability of their cabinet (Holzhacker, 2002;
Laver, 2006; Timmermans and Andeweg, 2000). During
minority cabinets, the government parties continually bro-
ker ad hoc deals with other parliamentary parties in order to
ensure a majority for their proposals and even the continua-
tion of their government (Strøm, 1990). Finally, we exam-
ine the effect of the extent to which government parties are
divided on an issue on the division between government
and opposition (Martin and Vanberg, 2008).
The reason that the impact of these factors on govern-
ment–opposition voting remains relatively unexplored is
related to a division in parliamentary voting studies. On
the one hand, scholars use advanced formal models that
see legislators play intricate games and use advanced meth-
ods, such as NOMINATE, which allow them to model
member of parliament (MP) behaviour in complex spatial
models (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985). On the other hand,
empirically, the field is almost completely focused on
single-country case studies (Amat and Falcó-Gimeno,
2014; Andeweg, 2004; Boston and Bullock, 2010; Chris-
tiansen and Pedersen, 2012; Field, 2009; Otjes and
Louwerse, 2014). Most of the comparative research in the
field is descriptive and qualitative, incorporating contex-
tual and institutional factors (Bale and Bergman, 2006a,
2006b; Christiansen and Damgaard, 2008; Holzhacker,
2002). The number of studies that analyse voting data using
both these advanced quantitative methods and the theore-
tical complexity of the advanced case studies is limited
(Coman, 2015; Cox and McCubbins, 2011; Hansen,
2006; Hix and Noury, 2016; Morgenstern, 2004; Tuttnauer,
2014).2 We know of no study that analyses inter-systemic
differences in institutions and intra-systemic differences
between individual parliamentary divisions at the same
time. Yet comparative work that examines both these dif-
ferences is crucial for understanding what drives govern-
ment–opposition voting.
This study explores these patterns by examining parlia-
mentary voting behaviour in two countries: the Netherlands
and Sweden. As this is one of the first truly comparative
quantitative analyses of government–opposition patterns in
parliamentary voting behaviour, we wanted to select cases
that represent clear-cut cases of government alternation.
They differ in the extent to which government composition
changes after elections: Sweden has a history of wholesale
alternation and the Netherlands has a history of partial
alternation. They share a number of similarities. The Neth-
erlands and Sweden both have a parliamentary system of
government, a multiparty system, a history of democratic
governance and procedures where any proposal made by
any party is voted upon (and cannot be blocked by com-
mittee majorities or committee chairs). We analyse more
than a decade’s worth of voting behaviour in both the
Netherlands and Sweden.
Theory
Our aim is to explore why government and opposition vote
similarly in some votes and differently in others. We thus
conceptualize government–opposition voting on the level
of the individual parliamentary division (Otjes and Lou-
werse, 2014; Van Aelst and Louwerse, 2014). In a vote,
what is the association between parties’ support for the
government and their voting decisions? If all government
parties support a proposal whilst the whole opposition votes
against, this represents the largest degree of government–
opposition voting, whilst when both government and oppo-
sition are split down the middle, government–opposition
voting in that particular vote is low.
There is one complication that relates to the presence of
the so-called ‘support’ parties during periods of minority
government. These parties do not supply ministers, but
have a policy agreement with the minority government to
offer support on a range of policy issues. Therefore, we can
differentiate between three kinds of parties: government
parties, support parties and opposition parties. A govern-
ment party supplies ministers; a support party does not
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supply ministers but has signed a support agreement;
together government and support parties are called coali-
tion parties. We will refer to opposition parties as parties
either outside of the government or the coalition, depending
on the context.
In our analyses we will look at two variables: govern-
ment–opposition voting and coalition–opposition voting.
Government–opposition voting captures the extent to which
the government parties on the one side vote differently
from the support and opposition parties on the other side.
Coalition–opposition voting captures the difference
between the coalition parties (government and support par-
ties) and opposition parties. The difference between these
two concepts is thus whether we treat the support parties as
part of the governing coalition or as part of the opposition.
As our expectations are in the same direction for both our
dependent variables, we will discuss them jointly,
although, as we will see, the explanatory strength differs.
Wholesale and partial alternation
The difference between wholesale and partial alternation is
an important difference between party systems. As Sartori
(1976: 44) stated, ‘a party system is precisely the system of
interactions resulting from inter-party competition’
(emphasis in original). What makes a set of parties a system
is the way political parties interact when competing for
government (Mair, 1997). One can have two systems with
an identical number of parties, but if the structure of inter-
party competition is different, the political outcomes, for
instance, parliamentary behaviour, can be very different.
West European countries differ markedly in the patterns
of cabinet formation (Ieraci, 2012; Mair, 1997: 211–212;
Strøm and Bergman, 2011). In some countries, the patterns
of cabinet formations are fixed: access to the government is
restricted to a limited number of parties and a limited num-
ber of governing formulae are possible. In these countries,
we tend to see wholesale alternation: after elections, either
one of two governments is possible. These two then alter-
nate in power. Cabinets of a bloc of left-wing parties and
cabinets of a bloc of right-wing parties come and go and
parties of the left and the right never govern together.
Given the importance of political blocs in the multiparty
versions of these systems, it is sometimes referred to as
‘bloc politics’ (Green-Pedersen, 2002). In other countries,
the patterns of cabinet formation are open: almost all par-
ties, including new parties, are potential governing parties.
Here government formulae can be very innovative (Casal
Bértoa and Enyedi, 2014). An element of stability is main-
tained through partial alternation: after the elections, some
parties stay in government, some rotate out and others
rotate in. Parties will gladly go into government with a
party that previously was on the other side of the govern-
ment–opposition divide. Parties of the centre-left and the
centre-right govern together. This means that the exact
composition of the governing government is less predict-
able after elections.
The idea that more adversarial patterns of cabinet for-
mation may lead to more adversarial relations between
coalition and opposition parties has been discussed often
but it has never been tested thoroughly (Andeweg, 2014; Di
Giorgi and Marangoni, 2015). In a polity with partial alter-
nation self-restraint is beneficial for all parties no matter if
they are in government or opposition. If, when in govern-
ment, parties pursue very narrow policy compromises,
excluding the opposition, they risk alienating potential
future government partners. Alternatively, parties from the
opposition do not want to distance themselves too much
from the government since that would jeopardize their
prospects to be part of future governments. Contrast this
with the situation in a polity with wholesale alternation:
there is no risk of alienating future government partners
by excluding them from compromises. Parties govern with
their allies and they have little to expect from the opposi-
tion, and parties in opposition can play their role as oppo-
sition in full.
Alternation hypothesis. The division between coalition/gov-
ernment and opposition is more pronounced in parliamen-
tary voting in countries with wholesale cabinet alternation
than in countries with partial alternation.
Ideological factors
Voting along government–opposition lines will be stron-
gest when the ideological divide and the government–
opposition divides coincide (Otjes and Louwerse,
2014). One example is when all parties on the right form
a government and all parties on the left are in opposition,
as has been the case, for example, in Austria (ÖVP and
FPÖ) between 2000 and 2007. Contrast this with a situ-
ation of a broad government (e.g. the grand coalition of
SPÖ/ÖVP that has ruled Austria since 2007). In the latter
situation, the government parties have ideological incen-
tives to work together with opposition parties to reach
certain policy goals (or at least to signal to voters that
they are trying). In the former situation, when ideology
and government participation overlap to a large degree,
there is little to gain for government parties by working
together with the opposition as they disagree with it on
policy. Opposition parties, at the same time, will tend to
vote cohesively, because they are all from the same part
of the political spectrum. The coincidence of the govern-
ment–opposition divide and the left–right divide is thus
likely to increase the degree of government–opposition
voting. As such, we expect that during cabinets with more
extreme policy positions, in terms of deviating from the
median legislator’s position, government–opposition vot-
ing will be higher.
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Cabinet ideology hypothesis. The division between coalition/
government and opposition is more pronounced in parlia-
mentary voting under extreme cabinets than under cen-
trist cabinets.
We argue that the political colour of the government and
the level of wholesale and partial alternation are closely
related. Systems with wholesale alternation will tend to see
either exclusively left- or right-wing government. Systems
with partial alternation may see governments of the left and
right, but will also see centre-left, centre-right and centrist
government. This means that the relationship between cab-
inet ideology and wholesale and partial alternation may be
characterized as a mediation relationship, that is, partial
alternation leads to the possibility of centrist government.
Centrist government itself diminishes the division between
coalition and opposition. Moreover, the coalition parties
will not want to antagonize the opposition parties because
their expectation of the possibility of partial alternation.
Wholesale alternation leads to either left-wing or right-
wing governments. If the division between left and right
and between coalition and opposition coincides, the gov-
ernment–opposition division may become stronger. But
this also leads to the expectation that government and oppo-
sition will not govern together in the future.
Mediation hypothesis. The effect of wholesale and partial
alternation on the division between coalition/government
and the opposition is mediated through the cabinet’s level
of ideological extremism.
Government majority status
The difference between coalition and opposition may also
depend on the status of the cabinet in the legislature: there
is a difference between minority and majority cabinets. Do
the party or parties that supply ministers command a par-
liamentary majority (Herman and Pope, 1973)? In the tra-
ditional view of politics during a majority cabinet, the
opposition and government parties will vote in opposing
ways (Laver, 2006; Hix and Noury, 2016). Under multi-
party majority cabinets, government parties work together
on the policies agreed in the government agreement, a set
of package deals, compromises and agreements not to deal
with certain issues (Timmermans and Andeweg, 2000). A
government party will not accept its government partner
sponsoring or voting for bills that go against the govern-
ment agreement (Holzhacker, 2002). On issues outside of
the agreement, MPs from government parties will foster
close relations with each other and coordinate compromises
and package deals on new issues as they arise (Timmer-
mans and Andeweg, 2000).
On the other side of the aisle, ‘[t]he duty of an Opposi-
tion [is] very simple . . . to oppose everything, and propose
nothing’ (Stanley cited in Jay, 2010). Opposition MPs have
an incentive to vote against any government proposal (Hix
and Noury, 2016), as, if the government is defeated in a
parliamentary vote, this may lead to the end of the cabinet.
Conversely, MPs from government parties have an incen-
tive to vote in favour of government proposals, because in a
snap election they risk losing their parliamentary seat and
their power as part of the government. Even when their
hopes of defeating the government are small, opposition
parties may gain from building a voting record against the
government, which will help to present themselves as a
genuine alternative at the next elections.
This image of parliamentary politics is refuted by
actual voting patterns in parliaments not only in West-
minster systems where this idea of government and oppo-
sition arose from but also in other case studies (Andeweg,
2013; Di Giorgi and Marangoni, 2015; Van Mechelen and
Rose, 1986): parties of the opposition and of the govern-
ment often vote together. Little is known about why gov-
ernment and opposition would choose to cooperate
instead of competing.
Minority cabinets can be subdivided into supported and
unsupported minority cabinets. In an unsupported minority
cabinet, the cabinet has to build an ad hoc majority for
every vote (Strøm, 1984, 1990). During unsupported
minority cabinets, the government party or parties continu-
ously need to find a majority for their legislative proposals:
a cabinet must attempt to build a majority for every vote on
an ad hoc basis. Such a cabinet must negotiate continually
with non-government parties to stay in office and imple-
ment its policy agenda (Hix and Noury, 2016; Strøm, 1984,
1990). Essentially, all parties and MPs are potential part-
ners for ad hoc agreements.
During a supported minority cabinet, government par-
ties form an agreement with one or more parties in the
legislature to assure their support for the government in
crucial votes. In order to qualify as a supported minority
cabinet, the support agreement must be made public prior
to the formation of the cabinet, involve parties that together
command a parliamentary majority, and concern compre-
hensive long-term cabinet policies as well as the survival of
the cabinet (Bale and Bergman, 2006b: 424; Strøm, 1984,
1990). The political science literature on supported minor-
ity cabinets is mixed about the likelihood of cooperation
across the government–opposition divide during supported
minority cabinets: Strøm (1984: 223; 1997: 56) considers
such supported minority cabinets ‘majority cabinets in dis-
guise’, because in daily practice, they function much like
multiparty majority cabinets as they can count on a reliable
majority in parliament.
During supported minority cabinets, however, the unity
of the coalition is weaker when dealing with policy issues
not covered by the government agreement. On these issues,
the cabinet must find an ad hoc majority for its policies: for
instance, in New Zealand, the Netherlands and Denmark,
the government and support parties have in the past agreed
to disagree on foreign policy (Bale and Bergman, 2006b;
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Boston and Bullock, 2010; Christiansen and Pedersen,
2012; Otjes and Louwerse, 2014). On such issues, the gov-
ernment parties have to search for ad hoc majorities like an
unsupported minority government, whilst on issues on
which the support and government parties have an agree-
ment, they cooperate as though they are a majority cabinet.
Cabinet-type hypothesis. During minority cabinets, the divi-
sion between coalition/government and opposition is less
pronounced in parliamentary voting than during majority
cabinets.
Issue divisiveness
A final factor that may play a role is the divisiveness of
issues: the degree to which government and opposition par-
ties are ideologically divided on the issues that are under
consideration. This builds upon the work of Martin and
Vanberg (2008) who have looked at the ways in which gov-
ernment parties keep tabs on each other. They demonstrate
that when government parties are divided on an issue, bills
take longer to be passed. Similarly, government parties
might choose to cooperate with opposition parties on parlia-
mentary proposals concerning those issues on which they do
not see eye to eye with their government partners. Whilst this
may undermine government stability, this kind of coopera-
tion between opposition and government parties may allow
for more stable policy outcomes in the long run, as the
opposition parties that supported the government on a given
issue will, if they become governing parties themselves,
prevent the new government from changing the status quo.
Issue divisiveness hypothesis. The division between coalition/
government and opposition is less pronounced if govern-
ments are divided compared to when they are not divided.
Case selection
To test our hypotheses, we need to analyse countries that
have different patterns of cabinet formation, variance in
terms of ideology, as well as both minority and majority
cabinets. To maximize comparability, we look at West
European countries with parliamentary forms of govern-
ment and multiparty systems that have been democratic
since the end of the Second World War.3 Given that our
argument deals with the effects of multiple repetitions of
the government-formation ‘game’, a substantial history of
democratic rule is necessary, in order to allow stable pat-
terns of government formation to be established.
Table 1 gives an overview of the occurrence of majority
governments and wholesale alternation. We want to look at
countries that have experienced both majority and minority
cabinets: this excludes Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg,
Austria, Finland, Ireland and Denmark, which have seen
only one kind of cabinet. Italy and Belgium are also
excluded since the only minority governments in these
countries were caretaker cabinets. This leaves the Nether-
lands as a country that has only seen partial alternation. In
terms of wholesale alternation, both Sweden and Norway
fit the bill. Given the greater role of the European Union in
the domestic politics of the Netherlands and Sweden than in
Norway, we determined that Sweden would be a more
comparable case.
Since 1977, the core of Dutch cabinets has always
been formed by two of the three major parties: the Chris-
tian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl),4
the centre-right Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid
en Democratie) and the social democratic Labour Party
(Partij van de Arbeid). During cabinet formations one of
these parties stays in government and often one of the
other parties enters the government, whilst the third one
leaves. As can be seen in Table 2, these parties are often
joined by other parties in order to create a multiparty
majority cabinet.
A substantial number of cabinets have been minority
cabinets, but with the exception of the first Cabinet-Rutte
that governed between 2010 and 2012 (Otjes and Lou-
werse, 2014), these have been formed after a cabinet crisis.
Parliamentary multiparty majority governments are associ-
ated with ‘monism’: the osmosis of the government parties
in parliament and the cabinet (Andeweg, 1992: 161, 2004:
575–576, 2006: 232). The prime minister, the deputy prime
minister(s) and the leaders of government parties meet reg-
ularly to set lines of cabinet policy (Timmermans and
Andeweg, 2000: 383).
The Scandinavian countries combine minority govern-
ments with wholesale alternation in government: Sweden is
a clear example of this as can be seen in Table 3. Most
governments since the Second World War have been
Table 1. Cabinet composition in 12 West European democracies


















Source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2012).
aPercentage of time majority cabinets ruled between 2002 and 2012.
bPercentage of government alternations were wholesale between 2002
and 2012.
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minority governments, most notably through single-party
minority governments by Sweden’s Social Democratic
Party (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti).
Between 2002 and 2006, the Social Democrats have
entered into formal support agreements with the Left Party
(Vänsterpartiet) and the Green Party (Miljöpartiet de
Gröna). The alternative to social democratic government
was a centre-right bourgeois government. In 2004, the four
centre-right parties, the Liberals (Folkpartiet liberalerna/
FP), the Centre Party, the Moderates (Moderata samling-
spartiet) and the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna)
formed Alliance for Sweden (Allians för Sverige): they
presented a common manifesto and expressed the ambition
to form a majority government after the 2006 elections
(Aylott and Bolin, 2007) and succeeded in this. The Alli-
ance for Sweden increased their vote support in the 2010
election, but lost their majority in the parliament due to the
entrance of the anti-immigrant party the Sweden Demo-
crats (Sverigedemokraterna). The Alliance for Sweden par-
ties formed a minority cabinet and struck ad hoc
agreements with different parties.
Methods
Our analysis aims to explain the degree to which parlia-
mentary votes display a contrast between government or
coalition parties on the one side and opposition parties on
the other side. Recall the distinction between the govern-
ment parties, the parties that supply cabinet ministers and
coalition parties that also include support parties in the case
of a supported minority government. Therefore, we use two
different dependent variables: coalition–opposition voting
and government–opposition voting. In the former, we con-
trast government and support parties with the opposition
parties; in the latter, we contrast government parties with
the opposition including support parties.5 We will discuss
the operationalization of coalition–opposition voting in
detail below; the operationalization of government–oppo-
sition voting follows a similar logic.
We measure these dependent variables on the level of
individual parliamentary divisions (Van Aelst and Lou-
werse, 2014).6 Intuitively, the highest level of coalition–
opposition voting is achieved when all coalition parties
support a proposal that is rejected by all opposition parties.
When there is no relationship between parties’ voting beha-
viour and whether they belong to the coalition or opposi-
tion, coalition–opposition voting is at its lowest.7 For each
vote we calculate the level of association between the vote
choice (‘yea’/’nay’) and coalition/opposition membership.
We use the w2-based measure ϕco (phi), which can be cal-







where, Cy and Cn stand for the number of seats held by
coalition parties voting yes and no, Oy and On for the num-
ber of seats held by opposition parties voting yes (no) and
Y, N, O and C being respectively the total number of yea
votes, nay votes, opposition party seats and coalition party
seats in that vote. When the option of abstention was used
in the Swedish case, the formula is slightly more compli-
cated, but the underlying logic is the same.8 Coalition–
opposition voting runs from 0 to 1, with higher levels indi-
cating a stronger divide between voting behaviour of coali-
tion and opposition parties. Most votes will be taken along
party lines and in the Dutch case also recorded by party.
Therefore, our data do not so much reflect intra-party con-
flict, but rather conflict between parties.
The parliamentary voting data for the Netherlands was
obtained from the Dutch Parliamentary Voting data set
(Louwerse et al., 2014). Almost all parliamentary votes
in the Netherlands are by means of a show of hands; roll
call votes are very rare. Votes by show of hands are counted
per party. When MPs deviate from their party line they
announce this to the Speaker beforehand, but this is very
rare. The Dutch parliament votes on motions (non-binding
expressions of opinion of parliament), bills (legislation)
and amendments (changes to legislation). The large major-
ity of bills is proposed by the government; MPs rarely use
their right to introduce legislation. Motions and amend-
ments are submitted by one or more individual MPs. Com-
mittee majorities and chairs do not have the ability to
prevent particular proposals from going the plenary; in
essence, any proposal a party puts forth is voted upon. For
each bill, parliament votes on the amendments first and
then on the bill in its entirety (as amended).
The Swedish parliamentary voting data were collected
by the authors from the Swedish Riksdag (Willumsen and
Öhberg, 2013). During the legislative process in Sweden,
Table 2. Dutch cabinets included.
Cabinet In office Status Composition
Balkenende II 2003–2006 Majority CDA, VVD and D66
Balkenende III 2006–2007 Minority CDA and VVD
Balkenende IV 2007–2010 Majority CDA, PvdA and CU
Rutte I 2010–2012 Minority VVD and CDA
Rutte II 2012–2014 Minority VVD and PvdA
CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal/Christen Democratisch Appèl;
VVD: Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; PvDA: Partij van de
Arbeid; CU: ChristenUnie.
Table 3. Swedish cabinets included.
Cabinet In office Status Composition
Persson III 2002–2006 Minority SAP
Reinfeldt I 2006–2010 Majority Moderaterna, FP, C, KD
Reinfeldt II 2010–2014 Minority Moderaterna, FP, C, KD
FP: Folkpartiet liberalerna; KD: Kristdemokraterna; SAP: Social
Democratic Party/Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti.
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all parliamentary decisions are first dealt with in one of
the parliament’s committees.9 The committee formulates
the majority proposal. Opposing proposals can be added
as counter proposals. The counterproposal that has the
highest support after an elimination voting procedure is put
against the majority proposal. When the government pre-
sents a bill to parliament, the MPs vote on the articles
within the bill.10 This means that in Sweden, like in the
Netherlands, the parliamentary majority cannot control
which issues are brought to a vote on the floor.
We analyse parliamentary voting in the Netherlands
between 200311 and 2014 and in Sweden between 2002
and 2014. We only study votes on legislation and amend-
ments and, in particular, exclude the Dutch votes on (non-
binding) motions. Moreover, we exclude unanimous
votes and votes taken when the cabinet had resigned or
a caretaker government was in office.
The independent variables were measured as follows.
Minority cabinet is a dummy variable indicating whether
the parties that have ministers in government command a
less than a majority in (the lower house of) parliament.
Cabinets that rely on supply agreements with opposition
parties are thus counted as minority cabinets.
Coalition ideology extremism captures how far the mean
policy position of the coalition parties is away from the
mean (seat-weighted) policy position of all parties. We take
the seat-weighted mean of coalition parties’ left-right posi-
tion in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015).
Subsequently, we subtract the seat-weighted mean of all
parties’ left–right positions and take the absolute value.
Similarly, we calculate government ideology extremism for
the government parties, that is, excluding support parties.
In comparison to coalition ideology extremism variable,
the government issue divisiveness and coalition issue divi-
siveness variables capture how divided the government and
opposition parties are on the topic of the vote rather than
the general policy differences that the former variable cap-
tures. We operationalize the division between government
and opposition and coalition and opposition separately. Let
us illustrate the measurement for government issue divi-
siveness: first, we calculated the (seat-weighted) position
of all government parties per issue. Next, we calculated the
(seat-weighted) absolute difference between each govern-
ment party’s position and the mean position. Thus, issue










where pi is the position of party i, wi is its share of the total
number of seats held by all coalition (opposition) parties
and n is the total number of parties. The issue divisiveness
measures were calculated for a number of issue dimen-
sions in each term. We used the closest available of either
the Benoit and Laver Expert Survey from 2003 or the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey from either 2006 or 2010.12
We manually matched these issue dimensions to each of
the subject categories available from the parliamentary
voting data.13 For the analyses of coalition–opposition
voting, we similarly calculate a variable coalition issue
divisiveness. The dummy variable Country¼ Netherlands
intends to capture the difference between two traditions of
partial or wholesale alternation (wholesale alternation is
thus the reference category).
Table 4 gives some basic descriptive statistics of the
variables that we employ. As can be seen, our dependent
variable is limited between 0 and 1.14 We find, however,
that all predicted values from a simple linear model fall
within this range. Therefore, we stick to a linear model,
which is easier to interpret. We take into account the multi-
level structure in our data by adding a random intercept for
the Cabinet during which a vote was taken.
As hypothesis 3 (H3) proposes a mediated relationship,
we need to use mediation analysis in order to test this
relationship. One cannot examine a mediation analysis in
a normal regression analysis. Therefore, we use the R pack-
age Mediation (Tingley et al., 2014), a mediation analysis
can be used to assess to what extent a relationship between
an antecedent cause and an outcome variable is mediated
through a third variable. In our case, the antecedent cause is
the difference between wholesale and partial alternation,
the mediating variable is policy extremism and the outcome
variable is the level of coalition/government–opposition
voting. In order to test whether the relationship between
the antecedent cause and the outcome variable is mediated
through a third variable, a mediation analysis combines two
regression analyses. First, we use the antecedent cause to
explain the mediating variable. Second, we use both the
antecedent cause and the mediating variable to explain the
outcome variable.
Additional control variables can also be included in both
stages. The key variable for the assessment of the level of
mediation is the average causal mediation effect (ACME).
Table 4. Variables used in analysis.
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum N
Government–opposition
voting
0.00 0.58 1.00 13,358
Coalition–opposition
voting
0.00 0.61 1.00 13,358
Government policy
extremism
0.12 1.31 2.83 13,358
Coalition policy extremism 0.12 1.43 2.83 13,358
Government issue
divisiveness
0.00 0.73 2.54 13,358
Coalition issue divisiveness 0.00 0.82 2.54 13,358
Minority government 0.00 0.47 1.00 13,358
Country ¼ Netherlands 0.00 0.44 1.00 13,358
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This is the product of the coefficient for the relationship
between the antecedent cause and the mediating variable in
the first analysis and the coefficient for the relationship
between the mediating and the outcome variable. This vari-
able indicates whether there is a significant mediation
through the mediating variable. For there to be a complete
mediation two conditions must be met: first, the ACME
must be significantly different from 0. Second, the direct
effect (that is the coefficient for the antecedent cause in the
second analysis) should not be significant. That is, there
should no longer be a significant relationship between the
outcome variable and the antecedent cause when including
the mediating variable. If the direct effect is significant, but
the causal mediation effect is also significant, there is only
partial mediation: some of the effect of the antecedent
cause goes through the mediation variable and some of the
effect is direct. The mediation package that we use runs
1000 simulations to calculate the causal mediation and
direct effect and assess their significance. Therefore, we
report the average causal mediation and direct effect.
Results
We have divided our results section into two parts: one on
government–opposition voting and one on coalition–oppo-
sition voting. Remember that in the former support parties
are counted among the opposition, whilst in the latter sup-
port parties are treated as part of the governing coalition.
The drivers of government–opposition voting
The results of the models using government–opposition
voting as the dependent variable are shown in Table 5
and Figure 1. Four of the five hypotheses are supported
by the data.
First, we examine the complex relationship between
partial government alternation and policy extremism,
which is the subject of the first three hypotheses. We
hypothesized that countries with partial government alter-
nation see lower levels of government–opposition voting
(H1), that cabinets with more centrist positions also see
lower levels of government–opposition voting (H2) and
that the former relationship is mediated through the latter;
that is, countries with partial alternation tend to see lower
levels of government–opposition voting because their cabi-
nets are more centrist.
Both partial government alternation and policy extre-
mism have significant effects on government–opposition
voting. The coefficient for partial government alternation
indicates that the country with a history of full government
alternation (Sweden) has higher levels of government–
opposition voting than the country with a history of partial
government turnover (the Netherlands). The coefficient for
policy extremism indicates that the further the ideology of
the government is from the mean, the more divisive votes
are between the government and the opposition. The like-
lihood that opposition parties are ideologically similar to
the government is lower during more extreme cabinets,
leading to a lower possibility of compromise over policy
between government and opposition. We also find that par-
tial government alternation has a strong, significant and
negative effect on government policy extremism: that is,
in the country where partial alternation is the norm (the
Netherlands), cabinets tend to be less extreme. Both the
ACME and the average direct effect are significant. This
means that there is a partial mediation relationship: the
effect is mediated for 49%. There is a separate effect of
having wholesale or partial alternation that cannot be
entirely explained away by the partisan composition of the
government. This means that the partial government alter-
nation hypothesis (H1), the cabinet extremism (H2) and the
mediation hypothesis (H3) are all supported.







Intercept 1.84 (0.01)*** 0.52 (0.05)***
Minority – 0.11 (0.03)***








Average direct effect 0.11 (0.04)***
Total effect 0.22 (0.03)***




Variance: Residual 0.00 0.06
Num. obs. 11,949

















Figure 1. Mediation analysis for government–opposition voting
visualized.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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This confirms our theory that when the identity of future
government partners is unknown, governing parties have an
incentive to exercise self-restraint in terms of exploiting
their legislative majority for policy gains, whereas there
is less reason for such restraint when there is no chance
of having to govern in the future with a current opposition
party. We can use the Swedish case as a conceivable exam-
ple to illustrate the mechanisms at play: when the Swedish
centre-right Alliance for Sweden formed a majority gov-
ernment from 2006 to 2010 (the period with the highest
average level of government opposition found), it had
every incentive to exploit this situation to the fullest
through narrow policy compromises. First of all, it is likely
that the government knew that they were unlikely to stay as
a majority government for long – no centre-right govern-
ment was re-elected with a majority in Sweden since the
Second World War.15 Further, this government knew that
there was no risk of establishing a precedent of majority
government tyranny that could later be used against them;
the Social Democrats were extremely unlikely to obtain a
majority by themselves after the next election (the only
time this happened since the Second World War was in the
1968 elections).
The cabinet type hypothesis (H4) proposes that minor-
ity governments result in lower levels of government–
opposition voting. We find strong support for this hypoth-
esis. Thus, as expected, parliamentary voting when a
minority government is in power is less divided between
opposition and government. It is worth noting that this is a
partially mechanical effect; since governments in both
these countries almost never lose votes, an (unsupported)
minority government necessarily needs some opposition
support to pass bills, leading to lower levels of govern-
ment–opposition voting.
Finally, we find that as a government is more divided
on an issue, government–opposition voting increases
(H5). This effect is also significant, but in a different
direction from our expectation: governments tend to oper-
ate in a more unified way on issues where they are
divided. The most plausible explanation for this unex-
pected result is that when governments are divided intern-
ally, the government parties, knowing that they need to
maintain unity to remain in power, close ranks towards the
opposition and propose only the most narrow policy pro-
posals that can be agreed upon, thus leading to higher
levels of government–opposition voting.
Coalition–opposition voting in parliaments
Let us move from government–opposition voting and
instead see what patterns emerge when we study coali-
tion–opposition voting. Table 6 and Figure 2 show the
mediation model using levels of coalition–opposition vot-
ing as the dependent variable. As support agreements blur
the distinction between opposition and government, the
effects for coalition–opposition voting are different from
the effects for government–opposition voting. Some pat-
terns are stronger, others weaker. Again, we start with the
complex mediation analysis: is the relationship between
partial government alternation and coalition–opposition
voting mediated through policy extremism? In the analysis
explaining coalition–opposition voting, we find that the
direct effect of partial government alternation is in the
expected negative direction, but not significant. The coef-
ficient for policy extremism is significant: the more
extreme the ideological position of the coalition, the higher
levels of coalition–opposition voting is found. Moreover,
as above, more extreme coalitions are more likely in the
country with wholesale government alternation. Because of
these two significant relationships, the ACME is







Intercept 1.83 (0.01)*** 0.47 (0.06)***
Minority – 0.08 (0.04)*










Average direct effect 0.04 (0.05)
Total effect 0.15 (0.04)***
REML criterion 292,505 2462
Variance: Cabinet
(intercept)
0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.04)
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Figure 2. Mediation analysis for coalition–opposition voting
visualized.
***p < 0.001; *p < 0.05.
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significant. This means that there is full mediation; 72% of
the effect is mediated. This corroborates H3. Whilst the
alternation hypothesis (H1) holds, its effect is fully indirect,
through policy extremism; there is no direct effect of alter-
nation on coalition–opposition voting. H2 is thus supported
by the data. All in all, the result of the mediation analysis is
stronger for coalition–opposition voting than for govern-
ment–opposition voting.
Support is also found for the cabinet type hypothesis
(H4). The relationship is negative and significant, but it
is weaker and less significant than the effect for govern-
ment–opposition voting. This indicates that the minority
cabinets we study tend to function more like majority gov-
ernments in disguise, relying on a majority coalition in
parliament more than one would expect from the previous
analysis but that these supported minority governments still
build ad hoc coalitions on some issues. We find no signif-
icant effects for coalition issue divisiveness (H5), whilst we
do find a significant effect for government-issue divisive-
ness above. In both cases, our hypothesis is not supported.
For coalition–opposition voting, it does not appear to be the
case that coalition parties strike narrow policy proposals on
issues on which they are divided.16
Robustness of the results
Our analyses of the effect of government alternation are
based on only two countries: our partial government alter-
nation dummy variable is equal to 1 for the Netherlands and
0 for Sweden. Therefore, we need to carefully consider
whether other differences between these two countries
might be responsible for the effect on government–opposi-
tion voting. Which other factors might explain lower levels
of government–opposition voting in the Netherlands?
There is a set of characteristics on which Sweden and the
Netherlands differ, but which we would argue should result
in higher government–opposition voting in the Nether-
lands, rather than lower, as found above. First, Sweden has
a history of minority cabinets, interrupted by majority cabi-
nets, and the Netherlands has a history of majority cabinets,
interrupted by minority cabinets. One might expect that this
majority tradition leads to higher levels of coalition–oppo-
sition voting compared to Sweden with its history of ad hoc
agreements, even when a majority cabinet took office in
2010. We observe, however, lower levels of coalition–
opposition voting in the Netherlands. Second, Sweden has
a stronger committee system compared to the Dutch sys-
tem, with Swedish committees having the right to rewrite
legislation (Strøm, 1999). The stronger committee system
in the Swedish parliament might cut across party alle-
giances to a larger degree than in the Dutch parliament.
Again, we find that our result run in the opposite direction.
This is also true for cabinet duration, which is, on average,
shorter in the Netherlands than Sweden (Lijphart, 2012:
120). We would expect that cabinets that can expect more
instability would have stronger incentives to stick together
in parliamentary votes, which would result in higher rather
than lower government–opposition voting. Therefore, if
these variables would have any effect on government–
opposition voting, we would strongly expect this to be in
the opposite direction of what we find. Both countries are
quite corporatist, but Sweden is the most corporatist coun-
tries among Western democracies (Siaroff, 1999): as deci-
sions that are pre-cooked in tripartite agreements are less
likely to be politically controversial, one would expect
lower government–opposition voting in Sweden compared
to the Netherlands. Calculating the levels of party system
polarization using the positions from the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey, it is found that the Netherlands would have
a slightly higher level of polarization (Bakker et al., 2015;
Dalton, 2008): the Netherlands has a an average value of
4.5 for the four parliaments between 2003 and 2014 and
Sweden an average of 4.0 for the three parliaments between
2002 and 2014 (on a scale from 0 to 10). On basis of this
one would, again, expect higher levels of government–
opposition voting in the more polarized Dutch system,
compared to the less polarized Swedish system.
There are two substantially important differences
between Sweden and the Netherlands, which may explain
the lower level of government–opposition voting. First of
all, the Dutch constitution is more rigid than the Swedish
one, requiring a two thirds majority in both houses of
parliament for all constitutional changes. Therefore, if any
constitutional proposal is to be successful, it would gen-
erally require cross-party support. This is, however, only
true for constitutional proposals, which form a tiny frac-
tion of the votes analysed. As constitutional changes are
exceptional, there is no reason to expect that constitu-
tional rigidity would result in lower coalition–opposition
voting in general.
The second difference between the Netherlands and
Sweden that might explain lower levels of coalition–oppo-
sition voting in the former is the partisan composition of
cabinets. Sweden has a tradition of either left-wing or right-
wing cabinets, whilst many Dutch cabinets are centrist,
including parties from both the left and right. In fact, this
explanation is very much a part of our theoretical argu-
ment: we expect that a tradition of wholesale alternation
results in off-centre governments, which results in higher
levels of government–opposition voting.
Our model presents government alternation as the main
independent variable and policy extremism as a mediating
variable. One might argue that the causal order is reversed:
that more extreme governments are unlikely to be open to
the possibility of partial alternation and therefore cultivate
bloc politics. We have two responses to this argument.
First, whilst our government alternation variable is a
country-level dummy variable, our policy extremism vari-
able does vary between the cabinets we study. Therefore,
we would argue that policy extremism is a cabinet-level
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variable, which partly depends on (historical patterns of)
government alternation. It is problematic to assert that the
policy extremism of particular governments will influence
traditions of government alternation. Second, one might
argue that the exact causal order is not key to our central
argument. The main contrast is between bloc politics (Swe-
den) versus ‘centre coalitions’ (the Netherlands). As a
result of the bloc politics, Swedish cabinets alternate and
are off-centre, whilst Dutch ones only partially alternate
and are centrist. These two things move together to create
the different outcome between these countries.
Conclusion
Our comparative analysis of Sweden and the Netherlands
shows that the degree to which the divide between gov-
ernment/coalition and opposition parties determines vot-
ing patterns is related to the government’s ideological
composition and the status of the cabinet. Further, a key
antecedent cause is a historical difference in patterns of
cabinet formation.
The effect of coalition/government ideology is itself
determined by historical traditions of cabinet formation.
We compared Sweden, which features alternation in
office between a ‘left’ and a ‘right’ bloc, and the Nether-
lands, where government formation effectively is a free-
for-all. Not knowing the composition of future govern-
ment, constellations contributed to a consensual style of
politics, which even today leads to lower levels of gov-
ernment–opposition voting. The type of government alter-
nation itself, however, also affected the policy extremism
of coalitions and governments: Sweden has more extreme
cabinets than the Netherlands. This extremism itself inten-
sified the level of government/coalition and opposition
voting. The more ideologically extreme a government/
coalition is, the higher levels of government/coalition–
opposition voting will be, as the policies favoured by the
opposition are not amenable to compromise with the gov-
ernment parties. We found support for a mediation rela-
tionship in our analyses of both coalition–opposition and
government–opposition voting. Wholesale alternation
leads to more extreme cabinets, which lead to a starker
divide in parliamentary voting between the coalition/gov-
ernment and the opposition.
We find higher levels of government–opposition voting
in the Netherlands despite the fact that a number of struc-
tural features of the Dutch system would lead one to expect
higher levels of government–opposition voting there than
in Sweden: Sweden is more corporatist than the Nether-
lands, has a stronger committee system, has longer lasting
cabinets and has lower levels of party polarization. More-
over, Sweden with its tradition of minority cabinets actu-
ally had higher levels of coalition–opposition voting than
the Netherlands, which has a tradition of majority cabinets.
The effects of both minority governments was similar in the
two countries: we found that minority cabinets witness a
smaller division between those parties who formally
pledged to support the government in voting and those
parties that did not, due to the need to gain support from
at least some opposition parties. This is most clear in
Sweden, where both Government–Opposition and coali-
tion–opposition voting increased when the Alliance for
Sweden majority government took over from the Social
Democratic minority cabinet in 2006; it declined again
when Alliance for Sweden government lost its majority
in the 2010 elections. Finally, we find that contrary to our
expectations, the divisiveness of an issue within the gov-
ernment leads to higher levels of government–opposition
voting as government parties can only agree to narrow
compromises; this pattern was absent when studying
coalition–opposition voting.
This is one of the first comparative analyses of govern-
ment–opposition voting. We found support for four of our
five hypotheses when analysing our two ‘ideal-type’ cases.
This raises the question of the extent to which the phenom-
ena we establish exists beyond these two cases. A number
of reasons exist why we can expect similar, if weaker,
patterns to emerge in other settings. A number of country
cases are close to those studied here: In terms of wholesale
alternation, Norway in particular, but also Denmark share
most of the salient characteristics of Sweden. Similarly, in
terms of partial alternation, a range of countries from Bel-
gium via Austria to Iceland display most of the key char-
acteristics of the Netherlands. One can expect similar
patterns in these countries as uncovered in our analysis.
Our results are less clear for countries with a more mixed
history of cabinet formation, such as Ireland. Given the
crucial role of government formation in the politics of par-
liamentary regimes, and the repeated game nature of par-
liamentary politics, we would expect that the patterns of
government formation influence politics regardless of
where it takes place.
That said, whilst our findings are relatively robust, our
analysis focuses only on a limited number of cabinets in
two countries. Future research may want to extend the
number of countries examined with the systematic
approach that was developed here to test hypotheses about
the conditions under which coalition–opposition voting is
stronger or weaker. Moreover, it could explore additional
explanations of government–opposition voting, such as the
type of proposal concerned and who proposed it.
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Notes
1. One aspect that has gained considerable attention is the dif-
ference between parliamentary and presidential systems (Hix
and Noury, 2016) and voting patterns under different presi-
dential systems (Morgenstern, 2004).
2. The study of party unity (as opposed to coalition unity, which
is the subject of this study) also forms an exception (see
Carey, 2007; Morgenstern, 2004; Sieberer, 2006).
3. We exclude semi-presidential systems from our case selec-
tion (France) and countries where single majority party
governments are dominant (the UK). Further, as the Swiss gov-
ernment cannot be removed by the legislature, it is not parlia-
mentary in nature (Cheibub, 2007) and is therefore excluded.
4. Before 1977, the core position of the Christian Democratic
Appeal/Christen-Democratisch Appèl was held by the
Catholic People’s Party/Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP).
5. Of course, when there are no support parties, the two mea-
sures are identical.
6. Since our analyses concern proposals of importance, we have
excluded unanimous votes on which all parliamentarians
agree to a proposal. These ‘hurrah’ votes are in general
related to uncontroversial and minor issues. In the Swedish
case, these comprised 219 of 7686 recorded votes. The cor-
responding numbers in the Netherlands are 1800 unanimous
votes of 7725 recorded votes.
7. For an analysis of universalistic voting, see Collie (1988).
8. We do this by calculating the w2 for the vote using a coali-
tion–opposition by vote decision contingency table. From this
we can calculate ϕco by dividing w2 by the square of the total
number of votes cast.
9. A substantial portion of bills in Sweden are drafted by inquiry
commissions rather than the government itself. However,
these follow instructions set out by the government and hence
should not be understood as independent from party politics
(Petersson, 2016).
10. An exception to this is the budget. The parliament has to
except or reject the budget. However, the opposition cannot
just simply reject the budget, but rather needs to offer a bud-
get proposal that obtains more votes than the government’s.
Otherwise the government’s budget stands. By tradition,
members of parliament vote on their own party’s proposal
and if their proposal loses in the elimination process, they will
abstain from voting in the subsequent voting. The final vote is
between the majority proposal and the counter proposal with
the highest support.
11. We exclude the 2002 Balkenende-I Cabinet, because it was in
office for only 87 days, leaving only very few votes on bills
and amendments.
12. Earlier Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) do not include
parties’ positions on specific issue dimensions.
13. For Sweden, a committee on piece of legislation was assigned
to was used to determine the issue dimension. For the Nether-
lands, we used the topic classification as provided in the
official documentation.
14. In five votes, a party split evenly in the Swedish Riksdag,
preventing the calculation of the dependent variable (as no
party position could be established). These cases were
dropped.
15. In the 1973 election, the Social democratic government
obtained exactly half of the seats in the Riksdag (175 of
350). Since a proposal needs a majority in favour to succeed,
this situation was for all practical purposes identical to a
minority government.
16. As a robustness check, we reran the models separately for
Sweden and the Netherlands, to explore the extent to
which our results for H2, H4 and H5 may be driven by
a single country. In both Sweden and the Netherlands,
levels of both government–opposition voting and coali-
tion–opposition voting decline under minority government,
lending additional support to H1. We also find the
expected positive effect of cabinet ideology extremism in
both the Netherlands and Sweden, in the Dutch case, the
effect is significant (at the 0.01 level) in for both coalition
and government extremism. In the Swedish case, the lim-
ited variation on this variable (two of the three cabinets
have extremely similar values) means that the effect is not
statistically significant.
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